SEXO SEGURO IS BETTER THAN SEXO NA COSTA WAS ONCE SUGGESTED AS THE HEADLINE THAT WOULD MOST NEATLY ENCAPSULATE FLEET STREET'S (DEAR JOHN) MAJOR PREOCCUPATIONS .AS RAÇÕES OFERECIDAS PELO CANADÁ E PELOS U.S OF A E O TRIGO E O MILHO DOS MESMOS "BENFEITORES" FOI VENDIDO PELA EPAC A PREÇOS MUITO ENGORDADOS ....TENDO CLASSIFICADO O TRIGO DURO DE QUALIDADE SOFRÍVEL COMO SEMENTE BOTÂNICA DE ELEVADO VALOR E QUE INFELIZMENTE NÃO VINGOU COMO TRIGO DE PRIMAVERA POIS NECESSITAVA DE VERNALIZAÇÃO E PERDERAM-SE TONELADAS DELE NESSE ANO E O MINISTRO DAS FINANÇAS O JOVEM VITOR CONSTÂNCIO FOI BUSCAR 500 MILHÕES DE DÓLARES AO FMI

EM 1978 O PREÇO DO CABAZ VIRTUAL DE COMPRAS ERA FIXADO PELO GOVERNO E COMPARTICIPADO PELO ORÇAMENTO O CUSTO DO PÃO DA MANTEIGA E DO CAFÉ ERA DECIDIDO PELO GOVERNO ...DAÍ HAVER DISSO EM LISBOA E PORTO ...E FALTAR EM TODO O DESERTO DA MARGEM SUL COM BICHAS PARA O PAPO-SECO ÀS 7 DA MATINA E PRÓ LEITE ÀS 8 DA NOUTE COM O RECEPTÁCULO DE ALUMÍNIO ...O SALMÃO OU O CAVIAR SÓ CHEGAVAM À MESA DOS MUITO MUITO RICOS OU DE MINISTROS DA NAÇÃO ....E OS CHOCOLATES DE ESPANHA E OS CARAMELOS ERAM APREENDIDOS EM BADAJOZ E EM AYAMONTE ÀS TONELADAS EM CADA MÊS.....PORQUE A GUARDA FISCAL TAMBÉM COME....

SOCRATES SINISTRO NAS CORES E TRÁGICO NA LOUCURA EM CADA CANÁRIO PRESO HÁ UMA LENDA E DOZE NARRATIVAS À ZÉ DO TELHADO O FACEBOOK UMA ESTRADA VIRTUAL CHEIA DE MENDIGOS CEGOS E MUDOS E CARENTES DE UMAS LETRAS A DESCONTAR NUM FUTURO TENSO.

o conto do vigário é duma probabilidade atroz ...é como em 1976 os 189,100 desempregados do INE num ano em que mais de 200 mil trabalhadores da construção civil só tinham biscates para uns dias por mês e iam para FRANÇA ou para o BENELUX durante dois, três OU MAIS meses por ano ...IDEM PARA CENTOS DE MILHARES DE ASSALARIADOS AGRÍCOLAS ,,,TEMOS MAIS de 31 por cento de pensionistas não temos a inflação de 25,5% de 1983 ...em Maio de 1974 havia só 200 mil funcionários públicos contando com os militares do quadro ....agora há ....menos militares no quadro uns quantos milhares a contrato ..e mesmo assis as TAXAS DE JURO ATÉ 1984 RARAMENTE FORAM ABAIXO DOS 20%....E QUEM QUERIA EMPRÉSTIMOS TINHA DE PAGAR OS JUROS ANTECIPADAMENTE ANTES DE RECEBER A GRANA .....OS SALÁRIOS REAIS CAIRAM EM 1983 A ECONOMIA CONTRAIU E EM SETÚBAL ONDAS DE BANDEIRAS NEGRAS E DE FABRIQUETAS FALIDAS E NESSE ANO OS FUNCIONÁRIOS PÚBLICOS FICARAM SEM O 13ºMÊS ...NÃO HAVIA DIVISAS LOGO PEÇAS NOVAS PARA OS TRACTORES NÃO HAVIA EM BEJA OU EM ÉVORA OU EM FARO....VINHAM TODAS DE LISBOA E SÓ PAGANDO O TRIPLO DO QUE ESTAVA TABELADO.....ANTES DE ENTRARMOS PARA O EURO VIRTUAL DE 1999 O NOSSO PIB ERA DE 90 MIL MILHÕES DE DÓLARES

CARTA FECHADA A UM GRILO QUE PENSA SER UM ESCRITOR E NÃO SE DEDICA A CANTADAS PRA AFINFAR NAS GRILAS E DEMAIS BICHARADA ...DA LIGEIRA OU DA PESADA MEU CARO GRILO SOMOS ESCRITORES DE FACEBOOK SE FÔSSEMOS REALMENTE INTELIGENTES NÃO ESTARÍAMOS A ESCREVER AQUI ....E NÃO SE DEVE ESCREVER ESCREVER ...SÃO MAIS CAGADELAS DE MOSCAS OU CAGADAS DE GRILOS UMAS DESSAS ...SÓ UM GRILO CONFUNDIRIA CAGADELAS DE MOSCAS COM ESCRITA grilo o insecto tinha um desinteresse quase olímpico pelos mamíferos e pelas mamíferas inda mais ....se fosse um piolho talvez tivesse mais afinidades ....falésias de letras e só consegue uma boçalidade é muy triste ser traste das letras pretas patetas.... grilo que saltou tampouco é a imagem correspondente ao nosso plano de irrealidade ...como seria possível a um grilo mesmo falante ou escrevente ou escriba dialogar com mamíferos ? como poderia um insecto fazê-lo ? um insecto é um monstro do microcosmos uma entidade absurda e provavelmente surda a cousas que não sejam grilos... tinha uns olhos de pulgão triste e o rostro alongado parece uma tromba ou mesmo umas....branco-sujo uma carapaça luzidia uma cabeça córnea quitinosa coberta por uma membrana acinzentada e encimada por duas antenas quiçá como as que Pinho via no Dino ..

ÉPOCA SINGULAR 

HORDAS DE GREGOS MISERÁVEIS 

DEBAIXO DE UM CÉU CINZA COM NUVENS

SANGUÍNEAS DE UM VERMELHO TÃO 

LOUCO QUE ACHINCALHA 

O ROSA-CHOQUE 

FALANGES DE METEOROLOGISTAS 

ÉBRIOS E LOUCOS COMO UM CHAPELEIRO

PROMETEM UM CÉU VERDE-AMARELADO

MONÓTONO MAS MAIS SEGURO QUE 

SEGURO E COM MAIS VIRGENS QUE 

O ESTADO ISLÂMICO 

INFELIZMENTE AS VIRGENS SÃO TODOS

GRILOS...

So much for the essentials of the cognitive relation, where the knowledge is conceptual in type, or forms knowledge ‘about’ an object. It consists in intermediary experiences (possible, if not actual) of continuously developing progress, and, finally, of fulfilment, when the sensible percept, which is the object, is reached. The percept here not only verifies the concept, proves its function of knowing that percept to be true, but the percept’s existence as the terminus of the chain of intermediaries creates the function. Whatever terminates that chain was, because it now proves itself to be, what the concept ‘had in mind.’ [Pg 61] The towering importance for human life of this kind of knowing lies in the fact that an experience that knows another can figure as its representative, not in any quasi-miraculous ‘epistemological’ sense, but in the definite practical sense of being its substitute in various operations, sometimes physical and sometimes mental, which lead us to its associates and results. By experimenting on our ideas of reality, we may save ourselves the trouble of experimenting on the real experiences which they severally mean. The ideas form related systems, corresponding point for point to the systems which the realities form; and by letting an ideal term call up its associates systematically, we may be led to a terminus which the corresponding real term would have led to in case we had operated on the real world. And this brings us to the general question of substitution....li o nelo juro que li...Descartes for the first time defined thought as the absolutely unextended, and later philosophers have accepted the description as correct. But what possible meaning has it to say that, when we think of a foot-rule or a square yard, extension is not attributable to our thought? Of every extended object the adequate mental picture must have all the extension of the object itself. The difference between objective and subjective extension is one of relation to a context solely. In the mind the various extents maintain no necessarily stubborn order relatively to each other, while [Pg 31]in the physical world they bound each other stably, and, added together, make the great enveloping Unit which we believe in and call real Space. As ‘outer,’ they carry themselves adversely, so to speak, to one another, exclude one another and maintain their distances; while, as ‘inner,’ their order is loose, and they form a durcheinander in which unity is lost. But to argue from this that inner experience is absolutely inextensive seems to me little short of absurd. The two worlds differ, not by the presence or absence of extension, but by the relations of the extensions which in both worlds exist. Does not this case of extension now put us on the track of truth in the case of other qualities? It does; and I am surprised that the facts should not have been noticed long ago. Why, for example, do we call a fire hot, and water wet, and yet refuse to say that our mental state, when it is ‘of’ these objects, is either wet or hot? ‘Intentionally,’ at any rate, and when the mental state is a vivid image, hotness and wetness are in it just as much as they are in the physical experience. The reason is this, that, as the general chaos of all our experiences gets sifted, we find that there are some fires that will always burn sticks and always warm our bodies, and that there are some waters that will always put out fires; while there are other fires and waters that will not act at all. The general group of experiences that act, that do not only possess their natures intrinsically, but wear them adjectively and energetically, turning them against one another, comes inevitably to be contrasted with the group whose members, having identically the same natures, fail to manifest them in the ‘energetic’ waY I make for myself now an experience of blazing fire; I place it near my body; but it does not warm me in the least. I lay a stick upon it, and the stick either burns or remains green, as I please. I call up water, and pour it on the fire, and absolutely no difference ensues. I account for all such facts by calling this whole train of experiences unreal, a mental train. Mental fire is what won’t burn real sticks; mental water is what won’t necessarily (though of course it may) put out even a mental fire. Mental knives may be sharp, but they won’t cut real wood. Mental triangles are pointed, but their points won’t wound. With ‘real’ objects, on the contrary, consequences always accrue; and thus the real experiences get sifted from the mental ones, the things from our thoughts of them, fanciful or true, and precipitated together as the stable part of the whole experience-chaos, under the name of the physical world. Of this our perceptual experiences are the nucleus, they being the originally strong experiences. We add a lot of conceptual experiences to them, making these strong also in imagination, and building out the remoter parts of the physical world by their means; and around this core of reality the world of laxly connected fancies and mere rhapsodical objects floats like a bank of clouds. In the clouds, all sorts of rules are violated]IN FACEBOOKS which in the core are kept. Extensions there can be indefinitely located; motion there obeys no Newton’s laws....AND ALL FACEBOOK PEOPLE REST ALONE IN A LOONEY TUNED WORLD come ci come ça

There is a peculiar class of experiences to which, whether we take them as subjective or as objective, we assign their several natures as attributes, because in both contexts they affect their associates actively, though in neither quite as ‘strongly’ or as sharply as things affect one another by their physical energies. I refer here toappreciations, which form an ambiguous sphere of being, belonging with emotion on the one hand, and having objective ‘value’ on the other, yet seeming not quite inner nor quite outer, as if a diremption had begun but had not made itself complete

Experiences of painful objects, for example, are usually also painful experiences; perceptions of loveliness, of ugliness, tend to pass muster as lovely or as ugly perceptions; intuitions of the morally lofty are lofty intuitions. Sometimes the adjective wanders as if uncertain where to fix itself. Shall we speak of seductive visions or of visions of seductive things? Of wicked desires or of desires for wickedness? Of healthy thoughts or of thoughts of healthy objects? Of good impulses, or of impulses towards the good? Of feelings of anger, or of angry feelings? Both in the mind and in the thing, these natures modify their context, exclude certain associates and determine others, have their mates and incompatibles. Yet not as stubbornly as in the case of physical qualities, for beauty and ugliness, love and hatred, pleasant and painful can, in certain complex experiences, coexist.

If one were to make an evolutionary construction of how a lot of originally chaotic pure experiences became gradually differentiated into an orderly inner and outer world, the whole theory would turn upon one’s success in explaining how or why the quality of an experience, once active, could become less so, and, from being an energetic attribute in some cases, elsewhere lapse into the status of an[Pg 36] inert or merely internal ‘nature.’ This would be the ‘evolution’ of the psychical from the bosom of the physical, in which the esthetic, moral and otherwise emotional experiences would represent a halfway stage.

But a last cry of non possumus will probably go up from many readers. “All very pretty as a piece of ingenuity,” they will say, “but our consciousness itself intuitively contradicts you. We, for our part, know that we are conscious. We feel our thought, flowing as a life within us, in absolute contrast with the objects which it so unremittingly escorts. We can not be faithless to this immediate intuition. The dualism is a fundamental datum: Let no man join what God has put asunder.”

My reply to this is my last word, and I greatly grieve that to many it will sound materialistic. I can not help that, however, for I, too, have my intuitions and I must obey them. Let the case be what it may in others, I am as confident as I am of anything that, in[Pg 37] myself, the stream of thinking (which I recognize emphatically as a phenomenon) is only a careless name for what, when scrutinized, reveals itself to consist chiefly of the stream of my breathing. The ‘I think’ which Kant said must be able to accompany all my objects, is the ‘I breathe’ which actually does accompany them. There are other internal facts besides breathing (intracephalic muscular adjustments, etc., of which I have said a word in my larger Psychology), and these increase the assets of ‘consciousness,’ so far as the latter is subject to immediate perception